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Introduction  
Despite the decline of Beveridge’s influence in the development of recent social welfare 
programmes in the UK, many of the ‘basic structures’ in his report remain (Beveridge, 1942; Harris, 
2000: 87). The legacy is greater than that, though. Having captured the popular imagination with 
ideas like ‘cradle-to-grave’ support, and slaying the Giants of welfare - Want, Idleness, Disease, 
Ignorance, and Squalor – the report acquired a wider audience after its publication, and contributed 
to newer models and typologies developing after the more established systems (Esping-Andersen, 
1990; 1996). As a source of social cohesion and macroeconomic stability the schemes it generated 
provided many of the elements needed in an effective ‘floor of social protection’ (Bachelet, 2011: 6).  
For present purposes, Beveridge also provided a unifying point in the development of a social union 
between the United Kingdom’s four countries. Testament to this was the enthusiasm with which the 
report was met nation-wide (Timmins, 2001: 23), and what for a long time seemed to be a powerful 
consensus on what ‘social security’ should mean.  
The ability of people anywhere in the UK to access welfare support, including health care from the 
jewel in the Welfare State crown - the National Health Service - served to promote a sense of 
common identity based on the three components of citizenship – civil, political, and social – 
identified by T.H. Marshall in his epic work on citizenship and class (Marshall, 1950), and informed a 
more recent understanding of citizenship as a unifying concept (Rees, 2016: 4). Interestingly, the 
Commission on Devolution in Wales in 2014 commented that ‘a common level of social protection 
for all our citizens is fundamental to the continuation of the UK’ (Silk Commission, 2014). Some 
commentators have gone much further, though, talking about such features of the Welfare State 
providing shared social citizenship, and as providing an ‘agent of cohesion’ (Béland and Lecours, 
2011: 137), an ‘essential component of Britishness’, and a ‘strong focus of attachment’. Arguably, 
however, that shared social citizenship has come increasingly under threat began with some of the 
more contentious programmes introduced by New Labour, and more recent and in some cases 
highly controversial changes under Conservative-led coalitions, such as measures like the ‘bedroom 
tax’ - a system of reducing housing costs support if a property is under-occupied (Mullen, 2014: 638).  
More recently and, again, controversially - particularly in countries like Scotland and Northern 
Ireland which voted Remain in the EU referendum - a Conservative-Democratic Unionist Party 
alliance seems intent on engineering a ‘hard’ Brexit, signalling the possible start of new initiatives 
post-withdrawal for dismantling gains and rights from the EU as citizens’ other social union.   
Unfortunately the mechanisms currently being put in place by the UK’s European Union 
(Withdrawal) Bill 2017 provide some ready-made mechanisms, including extensive ministerial law-
making powers, to facilitate such a Brexit and roll back a range of social rights. 
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In the UK context much is made of regional differences and a ‘North-South divide’ as shorthand for a 
growing range of cultural, economic, and social differences within the UK (Martin: 390; Rowthorn, 
363). Coupled with this is a growing concern about the negative impact of cut to welfare provision 
on regions like Wales and Scotland, given their higher dependency on social security benefits than 
other parts of the UK. Research for the Welsh Assembly has indicated, for example, that ‘Wales has 
the highest take-up of welfare support in Britain, with nearly 19 per cent of the working age 
population on benefits, compared to the British average of 15 per cent’ (Johnson, 2016). 
Furthermore, one of the biggest proponents of further devolution to Wales, the influential Bevan 
Foundation, has pointed out how the Commission on Empowerment and Responsibility when 
examining the scope for further devolution for Wales recorded that expenditure on social protection 
is 13% higher per head than the UK average (Bevan, 2016: 9). In the Scottish context similar 
disparities have also become a powerful a potent element in the narrative, as is the argument that a 
more distinctly ‘Scottish’ blue-print for social security will deliver a better, fairer system for Scotland 
(Scottish Government, 2015; Scottish Government, 2016; Scottish Parliament, 2017).  
If Westminster welfare reforms, often driven by the austerity and spending targets shaped by 
constraints in the Budget Responsibility and National Audit Act 2011 and Charter for Budget 
Responsibility (the UK’s equivalent of EU fiscal compacts in the Treaty on Stability, Co-ordination, 
and Governance embedded in Member States’ systems: Craig, 2012: 232; Prosser, 2016: 113), are 
the ‘problem’ then the perceived solution and response from the devolved institutions – especially 
in Edinburgh - has been measures at a devolved level to mitigate the impact of such austerity. 
Besides the perception that poorer UK regions are bearing much of the brunt of austerity, there are 
some clear ideological battles to be fought out. As some commentators have suggested, the ability 
to deploy devolved powers in countries like Scotland provide useful opportunities to demonstrate 
distinctiveness as part of a ‘nationalist mobilisation’ - especially if progressive social legislation 
accords with ‘Scottish egalitarian values’ (Béland and Lecours, 2011: 140; McKewen, 2002: 79). 
Arguably, the perception that ‘local is best’ offers another potent dimension to welfare nationalism. 
Yet, in practice such a deployment of local power does not always produce the outcomes expected. 
Apart from the difficulties associated with funding of improvements to existing provision – a matter 
that often remains firmly within the control of central administrations – devolution of power can be 
inherently problematic. Typically, central governments may see advantages in transferring the 
burden of responsibility (including political accountability) for welfare programmes. Indeed they may 
be happy to see such initiatives, especially when the programmes in question are failing or 
unpopular, or both. One of the schemes Edinburgh has recently partly taken over is the Work 
Programme, seen by some commentators as one the worst programmes for the unemployed in 
living memory. Putting many of its worst features right is achievable, but it will be time-consuming 
and costly. Similar considerations apply to Universal Credit – a point revisited later.  
Decentralisation and devolution of power to run programmes can also provide central governments 
under pressure with a ready means of ‘clamping down’ on rising fiscal costs. Indeed this may have 
been a feature of the reforms to social care and support in the Netherlands involving transfers of 
responsibility from the sphere of national public insurance to the responsibility of municipalities 
under the Dutch Social Support Act 2007 – most notably in the area of programmes for disabled and 
younger people (Dijkhoff, 2014: 276).  
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In neighbouring France a transfer of responsibilities also looks set to be the likely preferred solution 
which the Macron government is considering in response to the difficulties départements have been 
experiencing in resourcing costly schemes like the Revenu de Solidarité Active in the face of rising 
demand (Guichard, 2016). However, the ‘transfer’ in this case is expected to be the other away, ie 
from regional agencies and to central government. Again, it is a programme which has been 
controversial, and seen by the Right in the past as a ‘failing’ scheme (Landre, 2014).  The concern is 
that a transfer to the centre will make it even easier to cut costs, thereby limiting access to the 
support the RSA gives to millions of citizens as part of wider fiscal economies.  
Despite such fiscal considerations, the transference of powers from the centre to the regions with a 
view to plugging gaps in welfare provision chimes with subsidiarity principles, and the idea that 
‘local’ is synonymous with ‘best’ - especially when devolved administrations should be expected to 
have a better grasp on the needs of their constituents (and certainly better than ‘remote’ central 
governments). A key problem in practice, though, is that the devolution process can, and often does, 
give rise to legal as well as political conflicts over ‘competence’, with the courts becoming key 
players in shaping outcomes. There may also be issues of legal accountability if powers are perceived 
by the centre or other stakeholders as mis-used. The UK has had more than its fair share of such 
conflicts, historically.  
This has no doubt played a part in the legislature trying to lay down clear parameters between so 
called ‘devolved’ and ‘reserved’ matters (as can now be seen in the carefully drafted provisions of 
the Scotland Act 1998, s.29 and Schedule 5: most recently revised in 2016).  
The scope for judicial intervention was seen, for example, in cases generated by the 1920s Poplarism 
movement. In this period Labour Party-led local governments had sought to implement improved 
welfare schemes, including the creation of jobs for which equal pay for equal work principles were 
implemented. Given the increased costs involved this inevitably brought local administrations into 
conflict with central government, prompting ministers and judges to brand aspects of Poplarism as 
‘socialist philanthropy gone mad’ and ‘irrational’ in legal terms. Many initiatives ended in major 
court battles for nearly a decade, most of which were won by central government, typically on the 
basis that municipal powers were being used for improper purposes.  
Cases could produce some high-level casualties, including future Labour Prime Ministers like 
Clement Attlee who was sent to jail with other East London local government leaders for refusing to 
back down over schemes deemed by the courts to be unlawful by the courts (Roberts v Hopwood, 
1921). Many of the issues had both a ‘class’ and a ‘geographical’ poverty dimension to them; and the 
ripples quickly spread from Poplar - one of the poorest areas of London -  to other areas of the UK 
including Wales and Scotland (Johnson, 2000). 
In the rest of this paper it is proposed to consider the way devolved governments in the UK have 
been making use of devolved powers in the area of social security. Consideration is also given to the 
extent to which current ‘fragmentation’ trends, in the sense of shifts of power away from the centre 
and towards regional and local government (Vonk, 2015: 565), could lead in time to a rather more 
fundamental disintegration of the current UK regime. The context in which devolved measures, 
especially those like the Social Security (Scotland) Bill 2017, needs to be considered. 
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Austerity, Divergence and Devolution 
UK welfare schemes have been particularly hard-hit since at least 2010 by a series of austerity-led 
measures from Westminster, including ‘freezes’ on annual benefits upratings, replacement of major 
programmes in the areas of disability and incapacity support, and cuts to budgets for Community 
Care programmes. Among the schemes experiencing a cut in the value of support have been 
entitlements delivered as part of the government’s flagship measure, Universal Credit (Browne et 
al/IFS, 2016; Finch/Resolution Foundation, 2016; Puttick 2017b). Inevitably this has impacted on 
living standards and levels of household and in-work poverty (Hood and Waters/IFS, 2017). 
Furthermore, in response to the perceived unfairness of many of the tougher adjudicatory 
procedures which have accompanied the changes – vividly and largely accurately portrayed in the 
Ken Loach film I Daniel Blake (Daniel Blake, 2016) - it is entirely unsurprising that devolved 
governments like Scotland’s have tried to hit back. A significant priority has been to try to plug the 
gaps left by those cutbacks – whether through income ‘top-ups’ or newer schemes; and also to 
remedy such perceived failings in the adjudication systems, many of them seen as increasingly 
illiberal in areas like active labour policies, conditionality and sanctioning – possibly following similar 
trends elsewhere in Europe (Vonk, 2014: 194). Indeed, it is this context that makes Scotland’s ability 
under recently devolved powers to provide such supplementary and additional support particularly 
intriguing. Perceived unfairness in adjudication measures has also featured strongly in reforms. 
Tensions about the UK government’s programmes have undoubtedly been a major factor prompting 
Scotland to produce its own, distinctly ‘Scottish’ blue-print for social security (A New Future for 
Social Security in Scotland, March 2016). That agenda has now been assisted by the new powers in 
the Scotland Act 2016. Whilst the original devolution settlement in 1998 provided little by way of 
devolved power in the Social Security area – Social Security remained a largely ‘reserved’ area for 
both countries - the Scotland Act 2016 has transformed the position. The Act was a by-product of 
the Scottish Independence referendum, and a last minute commitment given by the leaders of the 
UK’s main political parties - just before the independence vote was taken - to grant further 
devolution for Scotland if voters voted ‘no’ to independence. They duly obliged, and the Smith 
Commission was promptly set up to see how that commitment should be honoured.   
In the event, the commission recommended a sizeable tranche of devolution measures in the Social 
Security area (Smith Commission, 2014: Heads of Agreement Pillar 2 Delivering Prosperity, A Healthy 
Economy, Jobs and Social Justice 42-62). Among other things, Smith recommended that important 
aspects of the social security system, including key benefits like Universal Credit, the under-
occupancy restriction (aka Bedroom Tax), and disability, incapacity, and care benefits – all bêtes 
noires as far critics of Conservative programmes are concerned – should be devolved. Furthermore, 
and even more remarkably, the Scottish Parliament gained powers to create top up benefits to 
alleviate some of the more significant impacts from schemes ‘reserved’ to the UK. It was also given 
control over key matters like unemployment support programmes and the operation of ‘core 
employment support services’ (Smith Commission 2014: 54-57) - albeit subject to funding principles 
and constraints ‘top up’ benefits which remain ‘reserved’ to the UK.  
Consequently, the Scottish Parliament has been introducing a range of initiatives on the back of the 
Smith Commission – initiatives which straddle both adjudicatory and substantive matters.   
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Needless to say this extension of devolution has not gone unnoticed in the other countries of the UK. 
In the case of Wales, for example, the primary contention has been that such further devolution is 
now necessary to cater for distinctly ‘Welsh’ problems, and to reverse the perceived unfairness of 
expenditure appearing to be lower in Wales than in England, and with decreases being seen as 
greater (Bevan, 2017: 11). Not unreasonably, though - now that greater powers and welfare rights 
have been extended to Scotland - the question has been asked in the other devolved institutions 
why social security claimants in one part of the UK, Scotland, should acquire improved support? 
Similar questions have been asked in the aftermath of the agreement between the Conservative 
Party and the Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland under which Northern Ireland will 
receive significant advantages, including added assistance with social programmes, as part of the 
deal by which the DUP will support the Conservatives keep power at Westminster until 2022.  
In the case of Wales, tensions have, in fact, already been simmering below the surface for some 
while, and across a range of social welfare programmes and labour market support provision. In a 
case frequently held up as an example of London ‘high-handedness’, in furtherance of one of the 
Conservative-led Coalition government’s deregulatory policies – removal of legally enforceable 
sectoral minimum wage floors – the government secured Westminster legislation in 2013 abolishing 
the Agricultural Wages Board for England and Wales. The problem was that Wales, and the majority 
of Welsh farmers and trade unions in the Welsh agricultural sector, not only did not want the board 
abolished - it was seen as a necessary and important means of maintaining fair minimum wages and 
conditions in the sector, and a way of containing the State welfare costs that would be incurred if 
wage levels fell as a result of abolition - it had put in place its own new version of the board as a 
replacement for existing arrangements. Despite protests from the Welsh government and the key 
Welsh stakeholders, London insisted on the abolition process continuing. Indeed, it denied Wales 
had any right to legislate on what it saw as the ‘reserved’ area of Employment. In the event, the 
matter went to the UK Supreme Court where Wales won the argument (UK Supreme Court, 2014).  
Northern Ireland, too, has been increasingly assertive in its dealings with London, most significantly 
when it rejected one of the UK central government’s most far-reaching welfare reforms in 30 years, 
the Welfare Reform Act 2012, thereby disregarding the ‘parity’ convention whereby Northern 
Ireland legislates to produce rules which mirror Westminster legislation (Simpson, 2017: 1). The 
reasons for that rejection are complex, and the UC scheme was eventually implemented: but it is 
likely that it was informed by studies into the likely negative impact of schemes like Universal Credit, 
including those of the Institute of Fiscal Studies (Browne and Roantree, 2013), specific aspects like 
cuts to support for the low-paid (Puttick, 2016; 2017b); and a wider-ranging dissatisfaction with the 
Coalition government’s welfare and spending policies (Simpson, 2017: 4).  
Despite rejection of the proposed break-away from the UK in the Scottish independence 
referendum, the independence debate has continued – spurred on to a great extent by the Brexit 
referendum outcome. The Scottish National Party (SNP) government argued strongly in the 
aftermath of the Brexit decision that this triggered a need for a second referendum on independence 
given that the Scottish people had voted decisively for ‘Remain’, and Westminster was planning to 
give them something they really did not want. It argued robustly that Brexit would have a 
disproportionate and negative impact on Scotland in terms of potential loss of jobs, trading 
opportunities, and inward investment.  
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Again, the social agenda featured strongly. In line with Remain arguments from other parts of the 
UK, Scotland has been clearly articulating the value of a beneficial, second-tier EU ‘social union’: one 
in which key social rights are more ‘secure’ and embedded than many of those at the domestic level.  
Whilst in many ways the Social Europe part of the EU project has been disappointing in recent years, 
the impact it has had in supplementing the UK’s domestic programmes must not be under-
estimated, particularly in key areas like rights at work, Working Time, Equalities, Acquired Rights, 
and rights linked to free movement (from which UK nationals have benefited as much as EU 
nationals). Furthermore, the opportunity to continue to participate in a Social Europe in the future, 
offering further gains, appears to have chimed strongly with voters.  
Unsurprisingly, therefore, the SNP government in Edinburgh has argued robustly since the Brexit 
vote that leaving the EU – particularly with a hard Brexit – is thoroughly bad news, and likely to 
impact disproportionately hard on Scotland in terms of potential loss of jobs, trading opportunities, 
and inward investment. The argument featured strongly in the SNP manifesto at the 2017 General 
Election.  
Nevertheless, the case for a second independence referendum suffered a set-back in the 2017 
election when the SNP suffered electoral reversals. So plans for such a referendum have been put on 
hold. However, this has not dampened enthusiasm - either among SNP supporters or more widely 
across the political spectrum - for reform of key welfare institutions and programmes. In any case, 
both the Smith Commission and the UK Parliament itself - by securing enactment of the Scotland Act 
2016 - gave the legitimacy needed for some key changes in Scotland.  
Accordingly, this year the SNP government in Edinburgh, having been given the green light to 
proceed to the next stage in the narrative, began the process of enacting enactment the Social 
Security (Scotland) Bill 2017 (the 2017 Bill).  
An Emerging ‘Scottish’ System? 
The 2017 Bill undoubtedly marks a decisive next step in the evolution of what could, in time, become 
a distinctly Scottish social security system. That said, it would be wrong to say that divergence 
between the social security systems of each of the UK’s countries is necessarily new. Pre-Beveridge 
there were points of divergence, some of them displaying ‘progressive’ features: others less so. 
Following the Report of the Royal Commission on the Scottish Poor Law (1844) important changes 
were made by the Poor Law Amendment (Scotland) Act 1845 and support, within a more closely 
regulated system of benefits in cash and kind by parish boards to needy claimants who could show 
they were resident and legally ‘settled’. Whilst much of this mirrored the social security law system 
in England and Wales (Mitchinson, 2000), rights in the adjudication process went further – for 
example by providing claimants with a right of appeal to a court, both in respect of the correctness 
of decisions and the scale of relief provided. Those who were dissatisfied with the kind of relief 
offered, or the amounts, could contest decisions before Scotland’s Board of Supervision (later the 
Local Government Boards), and Sheriffs Courts had the power to order kirk sessions and heritors to 
reconsider decisions and make new decisions.  
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Powers in the 1845 Act made it clear that claimants without an established `settlement’ could be 
refused support. Furthermore, Irish and English claimants without such a settlement in Scotland 
could be forcibly removed (Puttick, 2017a: H1). In this respect, the Scottish Poor Law could be 
harsher than that in England where, in 1803, the courts decided a foreign national and his family was 
entitled to support on the basis of the ‘law of humanity’ (Eastbourne Case, 1803) – a useful source of 
support for groups like asylum seekers and ‘overstayers’ until the 1990s.  
Relief for destitute claimants, including those affected by cyclical famine, rural poverty, and the 
devastating impacts of the Highland ‘clearances’ (Prebble, 1963: 170-180) was assisted, too, by 
Scotland’s Destitution Board system - a system of relief based on a hybrid mix of State funding and 
private subscriptions (arguably an early forerunner of workfare as it looked to able-bodied claimants 
to reciprocate by providing unpaid labour). Whilst not perfect it offered a lot more than available in 
other parts of the country, especially Ireland during the mid-19th century years of the Great Hunger.  
In more recent times Scotland has made provision in areas like healthcare, social services, and 
children’s palliative care not provided for elsewhere in the UK. These include free health 
prescriptions for all those needing medicines, and free personal care and subsidised travel costs for 
older people. Besides rejecting charges for higher education it has been clear about the importance 
of retaining local government control, as opposed to permitting ‘privatisation’, in key areas like 
domiciliary social services. The latter points undoubtedly represent a notable difference in 
comparison with the experience of citizens in England and the rest of the union (Mullen: 638).  
Added to that there have been marked differences of approach between the courts in their 
application of the law in areas like Community Care provision – for example in Scottish courts’ 
refusal to accept that making older citizens should have to go on to waiting lists before social 
services can be provided is lawful (Lanarkshire CC Case, 2001). The 2017 Bill, however, has now 
opened up significant new opportunities to deploy devolved powers to start constructing 
improvements; and it is against this background that the Bill can now be considered.  
The Social Security (Scotland) Bill 2017 
The legislation comes after consultative processes and published aims (Scottish Government 2015; 
2016). The headline news is that the legislation transposes no less than eleven key social security 
benefits on to a ‘Scottish legislative platform’’. The enabling legislation gives Scottish ministers 
significant powers, using secondary legislation, to ‘shape a distinctly Scottish benefits system, with 
dignity and respect being core to its approach’. A fuller account of the scheme is provided in the 
Bill’s Policy Memorandum and Explanatory Notes (Scottish Parliament 2017a; 2017b) but the 
scheme, in outline is focused on providing a common, unified process for demonstrating eligibility 
for assistance. This is the planned position whatever the particular benefit sought – an approach 
designed to overcome the ‘lack of clarity and confusion’ the government says pervades current 
claims and adjudication processes. The explanation for expecting detailed rules to be put into 
subordinate legislation rather than in primary legislation is that ‘the rules will have to change from 
time to time to reflect changes in economic and social conditions’, and ‘putting the rules entirely in 
primary legislation would not allow for this, and would impair their responsiveness to circumstances’ 
(Scottish Parliament, 2017a: 11). Some critics have said the move is an attempt to avoid scrutiny in 
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the legislature. It is clearly the case, though, that much of the current UK regime also relies heavily 
on secondary legislation. 
The Bill caters for a lot more, though, than just a re-working of the initial tranche of social security 
law, much of it focused on disability and incapacity benefits, and carers’ assistance. It also re-works 
the adjudication processes which are to operate, assisted by a set of core principles and a ‘charter of 
rights’ setting out what can be expected in the design and delivery of a Scottish social security 
system (Bill, ss.1-7): and there is an overriding duty on ministers to ‘give assistance following a 
determination of entitlement.  
Part of that process, and what is termed ‘on-going entitlement’, is aimed at maintaining 
‘uninterrupted support’ when there is no good reason to discontinue assistance. The aim is to avoid 
some of the current ‘stop/go’ interruptions to support that often characterise the current UK-based 
regime (Policy Memorandum, 24-27).  
In substantive terms the first tranche of legislation provides for a re-working of assistance in a 
number of key areas: disability and care benefits, cold weather and winter heating supplements, 
early years support, assistance after industrial injuries, and discretionary housing help (Bill, ss. 8-18).  
Other innovative features include the ability of decision-makers to determine entitlement without a 
specific claim if the relevant agency already holds sufficient information to determine an individual’s 
entitlement’: a change which undoubtedly cuts across existing requirements, including the general 
requirement that eligibility can normally only begin once there has been a claim and adjudication 
(Social Security Administration Act 1992, s.1). 
Arguably one of the most contentious aspects of the scheme is the ability of Scottish agencies under 
the new legislation to ‘top up’ the payments to a person who is entitled to a ‘reserved’ benefit. The 
only caveat, and it is one which does not appear to pose any great limitation, is that ‘the person 
must appear to need additional assistance for a purpose for which the reserved benefit is provided’. 
In this case the scope of such ‘top-ups’ will be in regulations (Bill, ss.45. 46). Otherwise, provision can 
be made to supplement payments in other key areas like Carers Allowances (Bill, s.47). Among other 
things this is designed to close the current gap between the rates at which Carers Allowance is paid 
and the rate of more advantageous benefits like Jobseeker’s Allowance. Support may also be 
provided which supplements housing costs when local authorities in Scotland decide this is 
necessary. 
In political terms, the areas in which the new provisions will attract the most support will 
undoubtedly be those which mitigate the effects of the more controversial aspects of Universal 
Credit including the ability to change the frequency of income transfers and single household 
payments, and to pay landlords directly for rent and other housing costs. Similarly, there is power to 
vary the housing costs elements of UC to overcome the impact of the under-occupancy restrictions 
(the bedroom tax). The Bill has also sought to address some of the tough external criticism levelled 
at the cuts made by the UK government, and their impact on ‘disadvantaged and marginalised’ 
communities - particularly since the Welfare Reform Act 2012 (UN Report, 2016; Scottish Parliament 
2017a: 48). 
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Conclusions 
As this paper has considered, current political trends and legal developments like Scotland’s 2017 Bill 
certainly provide some early evidence of potential fragmentation. The bigger question is whether 
this could, in time, progress into something more significant: a wider-ranging, more systemic 
disintegration of the current system and, in time, the UK’s social union itself? 
The answer to that depends on a range of factors including prospects for the economy, and the 
extent to which the tensions caused by growing socio-economic disparities between the different 
parts of the UK intensify. There is also a European dimension to this. Arguably, continued affiliation 
by the UK to the EU, in whatever form that might take - whether as part of the European Economic 
Area and Single Market, or on some other, more negotiated and tailored basis – will reinforce the 
current union, if only by sustaining a shared identity based on Europe. Such continuity is likely to be 
popular in Scotland, and may even obviate some of the arguments for a second independence 
referendum. That is still on the cards, even if any immediate likelihood of a further vote receded 
after the last General Election when the Scottish National Party saw some of its support decline.  
Going forward, UK participation in a reinvigorated European Social Union drawing on newer 
principles of solidarity (Vandenbroucke, 2016), would be an attractive prospect. There is no shortage 
of perspectives on this, of course. One of the UK’s Nobel laureate economists, Paul Pissarides, has 
argued for some while for a Social State capable of supporting decent quality jobs, assisting with 
labour market changes and adaptation to new technologies, and maintaining good quality social 
services to tackle poverty (Pissarides, 2014). A range of new approaches was recently outlined in 
papers in A European Social Union after the Crisis (Vandenbroucke, Barnard, De Baere, 2017).  
However, prospects for UK membership, or some looser affiliation short of a hard Brexit, remain 
uncertain. As well as differences over the costs of the divorce, areas such as free movement and 
linked social rights remain highly vexed issues. This currently leaves the future social rights, including 
the status of EU nationals in the UK, in a precarious position (Currie, 2017: 337). Arguably, that 
concern among ‘better together’ commentators has been worsening since at least 2015 when all 
three of the UK’s main political parties argued for a two-tier labour market, with less advantageous 
social rights and access to social security support reserved for EU nationals as ‘Team B’ players - at 
least until they satisfied lengthy residence and integration requirements (Puttick, 2015). 
Unfortunately, and somewhat opportunistically, this seemed to link to anti-immigration and anti-EU 
positions on the Right, including those on which the UK Independence Party went on to capitalise so 
effectively in the Brexit campaign. The outcome was not helped some of the obvious misinformation 
and distortions in which the Leave parties engaged, not least about EU residents’ abuse of the UK’s 
welfare system. The editorial board of the Common Market Law Review was particularly scathing, 
commenting on what it called the ‘systematic dishonesty’ deployed by the Leave campaign – 
something which extended to pretty well every aspect of the referendum campaign (CMLR, 2016).  
Revelations of the government’s draft plans for post-Brexit immigration controls suggest that the 
gulf over free movement between UK and EU Article 50 negotiators is still wide (Hopkins and Travis, 
2017; Hopkins, 2017). Yet despite the plans’ likely popularity with many Brexiteers, the position of 
the government – even with the help of Irish Democratic Unionist Party MPs - remains weak in the 
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UK Parliament. Indeed it is not even clear that the EU (Withdrawal) Bill 2017 in its originally 
proposed form can be approved, at least without significant modification.  
Among the thornier issues to be addressed is a dispute about the extent to which EU laws and 
powers from Brussels should be repatriated more directly to the devolved institutions rather than 
indirectly via Westminster: something also seen as providing some necessary insurance against a risk 
of future rolling back of social rights by London.  
Watch this space!  
Keith Puttick                                                                                                                                                      
Staffordshire University, UK                                                                                                                             
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